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Abstract  
The round of new membership had strong impact on the 
functioning of the European economy, both in terms of regulation, dis-
tribution of resources, and place of economic and regional develop-
pment, catching up policies (converging policies). 
This goes along with an important flow of foreign capital pouring 
in the region where the rate of domestic accumulation is still very low 
and would never match investment requirements to develop a strong 
industrial base. Firstly, this raises the question of the development of 
“a capitalist economy without capitalists”. Secondly, it highlights the 
fact that industrial recovery and economic growth are fuelled by 
foreign investments in the region 
In this contribution, our aim is to highlight the transformation of 
these economies with their linkage through their new specialization, 
control to EU-15 economies through the strong presence of Western 
Multinational Corporation (MNC).  
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Introduction  
The experience of the recent enlargement within the European 
Union is unique if we consider both the number of countries, the 
population, the level of economic development, the systemic 
characteristics of most of these countries, the speed and the cost. 
Those countries have supported in less than twenty years, three major 
shocks: a systemic shock with the implosion of the socialist system, an 
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economic shock with the adjustment to the new market environment, 
an institutional shock with the membership to the European Union 
(EU) for those who have applied to become members. A fourth shock, 
for some last comers and further EU members has been the violent 
disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia, which has delayed and 
hampered negotiations for future membership of the former Republics 
involved in the conflict (Croatia, Serbia…) 
The EU enlargement to 12 new members, of which 10 were 
communist economies under the control of the Soviet Union, took 
place in 2004 (10) and in 2007 (2), it has been the outcome of a long 
transformation process which started right after the fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989.  
During this process, the leaders of those economies had to handle 
and manage to reach two main objectives: the transition from a 
socialist economy to a market economy, on the one hand and the 
upgrading of these economies in order to allow them to become future 
members of the EU on the other hand. 
Following the June 2003 EU summit in Thessaloniki other 
candidates are crowding in at the door, all , except Turkey, from the 
Western Balkans (ex-Yugoslavia States, Albania), some being very 
close to the requirement to become a member (Croatia will officially 
join in Juanary 2013), other have been admitted as “accession States” 
and are discussing  with the European Commission the fulfilment of 
conditions  and the timing to become officially members.  
The round of new membership had strong impact on the 
functioning of the European economy, both in terms of regulation, 
distribution of resources, and place of economic and regional 
development, catching up policies (converging policies). The stru-
ctural and regional imbalance among « old » and « new » member 
states, the need to re-industrialize many regions in order to create new 
jobs and wealth are real issues. Regional GDP per head among the 
271 EU regions (NUTS 2) displays a very high disparity with the 
poorest region in eastern Bulgaria scoring 27% against 332% for Inner 
London. In the same time, as it can be witnessed in some regions of 
Central and Eastern Europe (The Bratislava region, Western Hungary, 
Warsaw region and Southern Poland), there are strong movements of 
industrial development, relocation of new industries, even in countries 
and regions which didn’t have specific advantages in this field under 
the socialist system (see the car industry in Slovakia).  
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This goes along with an important flow of foreign capital pouring 
in the region where the rate of domestic accumulation is still very low 
and would never match investment requirements to develop a strong 
industrial base. This raises the question of the development of “a 
capitalist economy without capitalists” which has been underlined 
earlier at the beginning of the transition Moreover; it highlights the 
fact that industrial recovery and economic growth are fuelled by 
foreign investments in the region. FDI has contributed to create a new 
industrial landscape in the region; it has also created a new economic 
dependency of these countries: most of them are today the host of big 
transnational corporations which have a strong impact on domestic 
industrial structure, specialization, ownership, developing strong links 
with Western European economies. 
Today Eastern European economies appear to be a backyard for 
Western Economies which, taking advantage of proximity, low costs, 
qualified labour, have relocated businesses which account, in some 
countries, for the main parts of fixed capital, added value, exports. 
These investments have contributed to create strong linkages between 
western Multinational corporations and their regional subsidiaries. On 
the one hand, they have taken advantage of existing competencies 
inherited from the former socialist system (Radosevic, 2004). On the 
other hand, their presence has contributed to the catching up, the 
development of new specialisations. 
In this contribution, our aim is to highlight the transformation of these 
economies with their linkage through their new specialization, control 
to EU-15 economies through the strong presence of Western 
Multinational Corporation (MNC).  
Section 1 presents the main components of transforming policies 
conducted in the region; section 2 assesses the role of FDI in the 
region has a driver of sectoral adjustment and catching up. Even for   
Balkan ‘late comers’  countries that have lately adjusted, Section 3 
concentrates on the development of a new industrial area illustrating 
the impact of FDI and the linkage strategy with Western companies 
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1. A Wide Enlargement Strategy 
A Difficult Adjustment 
Considering the size, the population, history, level of development, 
the last wave of enlargement, which has taken place in 2004 and 2007, 
is exceptional if we consider the history of the EU expansion since the 
foundation of the Common market in the late fifties. 
The number of new members entering in one row: up to now, 
earlier enlargements consisted of the entry of  up to three countries, 
generally of same economic level which had no difficulty to adjust to 
the new institutional and economic environment as they were already 
developed market economies (with the notable exception of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece). 
Difference in living standard and income distribution.  All the new 
members, even the most economically advanced (Slovenia, Czech 
Republic) are still far behind the mean level in the EU-15. With the 
exception of Cyprus and Malta, the 10 countries from Central and 
Eastern European countries have a mean GDP per head which is 50% 
compared to EU-15. The collapse of the former socialist industries has 
created strong regional inequalities and a high level of unemployment. 
Figure 1: GDP per capita (1000 €), 2010 
 
70%-80% of EMU average: Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia 
50%-60% of EMU average: Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,  
Around 40% of EMU average: Bulgaria, Romania 
Source: Eurostat 
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A systemic dimension. It is the first time that the EU integrates 
former socialist countries with noticeable differences among them: 3 
countries (the Baltic States) were part of the Former Soviet Union, one 
in the former pro-market Yugoslavia (Slovenia), another belonged to 
the COMECON and had partly specialized their economies in order to 
serve the Soviet economy and developed an autarkic economies with 
low specialization and limited exchanges with the world economy. In 
all cases, those countries had to develop market mechanisms, and then 
adjust to the standards of the EU to be able to support the 
competitiveness from the other members’ states as stipulated by the 
EU regulations. 
 A new geopolitical environment. With this new wave of enlar-
gements, the frontiers of the EU are moving eastward and southward 
raising new questions: security, political and economic cooperation. 
The European Commission and the EU leaders have set up a new 
neighbourhood policy which has to match different aims: assure the 
integration of the new members without deepening the gap with 
countries that are not yet members and that will join the EU one day 
(West Balkans countries), set up specific mechanisms to develop 
economic cooperation with other countries (especially from the South 
of Europe, Middle East and North Africa countries), fill up the 
strategic partnership with Russia, securing peaceful development in 
the region. The opening of official discussions with Turkey illustrates 
a sharp question discussed in the EU concerning where up to close the 
frontier of Eastern border of the EU. 
Managing the transition 
Integrating the EU is the last step of the long process of 
transformation. A precedent step has been the transition from non-
market to a market economy. This has required from policy makers a 
set of tools and policies in order to speed up and deepen the process of 
transformation. Consensus, among decision-makers with the popula-
tion, has been reached in some countries on the different objectives to 
match; in other countries, dispenses prevailed and have limited both 
the scope and the pace of reforms. 
In spite of these differences, all former socialist countries shared 
among them common characteristics concerning the industrial 
organisation, the control of firms, their financing, their level of 
technology, their specialisation in basic industries (military, heavy 
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industries), their poor records in intermediary and consumer goods, 
the total absence of a financial industry, the under-development of 
services industries. This has shaped what we could call a “bad 
industrialisation” if we refer to the mode of allocation of resources 
among sectors in market economies, to the low rate of innovation, to 
the under-capitalisation of firms, and, finally to the rigidity of the 
whole economic system. A socialist company has never been conside-
red has an autonomous centre of decision-making, managing its 
material, and human and financial assets, following a strategy among 
competitors. On the contrary, the system had low or even inexistent 
incentives, the State had a paternalist attitude towards companies, 
providing finance, capital goods, parts, creating a permanent shortage 
situation, leading large parts of the population either to “live on the 
beast” or to enter in illegal (but often tolerated) activities of the 
unofficial economy. Finally, the autarkic organisation of foreign trade, 
at the level of the former COMECON, has contributed to develop 
many comparative disadvantages among the economies of the region. 
Transition is not a tabula rasa, although that many industries have 
been difficult to turn around and to adjust and that many “industrial 
cemeteries” filled up the landscape in countries which had concen-
trated their industrial development in sector finally difficult or 
impossible to adjust.  
The Great Transformation:  
How to go to the market? How to adjust and restructure such 
economies, how to change the behaviour of workers and consumers 
confronted with a new environment such as unemployment, strong 
inequalities, insecurity concerning the future of important fractions of 
the population? How to create, often from scrape, a market economy? 
Did privatisations and the right to create new businesses are sufficient 
to promote entrepreneurship? Is it possible to jump from an admi-
nistrated economy towards an institutional capitalism, economi-sing 
on entrepreneurial capitalism which has played a crucial role in the 
early step of capitalist development in shaping the industry through 
the growth of big industrial groups? What kind of institutional 
compromise can be reached in order to control efficiently new private 
companies? Does a strong financial system is preferable to mono-
polies, chaebols or keretsu types of organisation in order to foster 
growth, fill the technological gap with western developed economies?  




The post-socialist transition has focused around four set of policies, 
each set having specific aims to reach on the one hand, the four set 
being interlinked, on the other. Concretely, this means that gover-
nment which have committed themselves, let say only on two sets 
leaving apart or paying less attention to the two others (which is the 
reason in the delay of some countries to join the EU) have failed to 
adjust rapidly their economies and to create the new market 
environment necessary to support competition in an open economy. 
a) Macro stabilisation for containing deficits and curbing 
inflation by reducing subsidies, increasing interest rates, 
introducing competition through liberalisation of foreign 
trade. Partial convertibility (before total liberalisation) has 
created a strong incentive to adjust, to relocate resources in 
more productive sectors with export prospects. Almost all 
governments have followed strict macro-policies. 
b) Implementation of market institutions and adoption of new 
regulation assuming property right and protection of private 
investments, establishment, economic laws on companies, for 
competition, for labour; creation of financial markets, of a two 
tier banking system. 
c) Re-entering into the world economy, lowering tariffs and other 
entry barriers, promoting the development of new 
specialisations: in few years, all countries will have switched 
their exports towards Western markets, beneficiating of price 
advantage but also of specialization of their exports on higher 
added value segment in part thanks to re-exporting strategies 
of MNC towards Western markets. 
d) Privatisation and restructuring former state-owned enter-
prises in order to de-monopolise big industrial groups by 
breaking them down through direct selling or through mass 
privatisation (free distribution to the population or to workers 
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Another dimension of the privatisations strategy,  privatisations 
“from below”,  has been the right to new entrepreneurs to enter the 
market and to establish their businesses (SME), it has also facilitated 
the entry of foreign enterprises on theses new markets through majo-
rity acquisition (through privatisations), new investments (Greenfield 
investments) or joint-ventures following opportunities, risks, legal 
environment. 
In all cases, new owners (external, former managers and workers, 
depending on how privatisation has been implemented) had to reshape 
very quickly their businesses by investing in order to avoid the loss of 
value of their new assets or to be stuck by strong insiders opposing the 
necessary restructuring. Corporate governance has become an impo-
rtant issue in the region, along with the development of competition 
policies and of financial markets. 
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Transition and integration 
Besides the building up of a new institutional environment, 
privatisation, the search of new competitive advantage concentrating 
on industries and services which could compete with EU-15 has been 
the main economic policy objective. The task has been made difficult 
as there were no more central bodies to promote and finance industrial 
policies at sectorial levels, there were any managing competencies 
available, the financial and economic environment was not clear. In 
the same times, the former specialisations of Central European 
economies have disappeared with the collapse of the Former Soviet 
Union as exports destinations shrank.  
Price competition, in the first step has played an import role in re-
switching exchanges towards Western markets, then, quality effect has 
taken the lead, mostly thank to the role of FDI in the region  which 
have been attracted by market prospects, low labour cost and high 
quality of human resources, quality of human resources. Restructuring 
has pushed non-performing companies to leave the market. Market 
opportunities have attracted foreign companies, leading to a strong 
connection with EU-15 economies both in inter and intra trade, the 
latter showing the level of integration with EU economies (Table 1). 
Table 1: Foreign trade structure with the EU according to the 
nature of the specialization, early years of the transition (in %) 
 
Intra-Industries Trade Inter industrial 
Horizontal Vertical Total  
Poland (1998) 
Hungary (1998) 






































Source: Conjoncture, BNP, September 2004, n° 8, 
Concerning labour, new member countries have relied on two 
advantages: the low cost of labour compared to EU and other 
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developed market economies, on the one hand (figure 3), and the 
quality of the work force on the other,  which, both have played a 
major role in attracting foreign investment in the region.  





2. FDI, an Engine for Economic Growth and Regional 
Specialisation 
The combination of the different measures implemented during the 
90s (stabilisation, institutions building, opening to the world economy, 
privatisation/restructuring of enterprises) has led to a new competitive 
environment in the region which shows higher rate of growth than in 
the EU-15  
Figure 4: FDI in Transition countries 
 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,2009. 
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Besides these measures, FDI has played the role of a real growth 
engine; bringing in capital, markets access, management know-how; it 
has also contributed largely to the spreading of new businesses in the 
region, often upstream, downstream and around the businesses that 
has been acquired of created through greenfield investments.  
Although the level of FDI is not so important compared to other 
destinations (around 6% of total world FDI)), nonetheless it accounts 
for a non neglect able share of GDP, of exports in some countries. 
Completing the transformation has began to attract big amount of 
foreign capital in countries which had been reluctant at the beginning 
of the transition to welcome foreign investment (Czech Republic, 
Poland).Countries which had been left behind and had not been able to 
join the first wave of new membership are getting substantial share of 
FDI, both Bulgaria and Romania, but also West Balkan countries 
(Figure 4). 
Attractivity policies: size, proximity, commitment  
Among the different reasons which explain attractivity of countries 
to FDI (market access, factor costs, there are specific reasons 
concerning this particular region. 
a) Proximity: most FDI outflows come from EU-15 companies 
(European or affiliates of US companies), quite few directly from 
overseas countries (Japan, South Korea).  
b) Regional integration and division of labour. The proximity factor 
reduces risks and entry costs, facilitates the development of 
regional strategies (“linkage”) among invested companies in the 
region. For instance, Skoda-VW, in the Czech Republic assembles 
its cars and exports parts and components to other assembling 
units of the group. In the same time, it integrates parts and 
components produced in Germany or else where among the 
group’s partners. Another impact of the presence of Western 
companies is to push suppliers (first and second tier) to invest near 
the new facilities in host countries in order to produce bigger 
volumes by reducing cost (economies of scale), take advantage of 
the new markets. Almost all suppliers of big car assemblers have 
invested near the newly acquired and invested firms in the region. 
Thus FDI create positives externalities by upgrading existing 
companies with strong impacts upstream and downstream the 
business, creating many spill over through the economy. 
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c) Labour cost and qualifications: The low cost of labour plays an 
important role in attracting FDI especially in manufacturing 
industries which requires a qualified manpower. With equivalent 
training and productivity, the gross cost of the work force in the 
region was around one/fifth of labour cost un Germany at the start 
of the transformation. Costs are rising but convergence with 
Western wages level could take a very long time. Taxation is 
another issue: the flat tax policy applied by many countries in the 
region makes a big differential with taxation in the EU raising the 
accusation of a taxation dumping and retaliation measures from 
the EU commission. 
Finally, mixing proximity, labour cost, workforce qualification and 
productivity, institutional reform and attractivity policies, country 
size, the distribution of FDI within the region as favoured both “early 
reformers” countries (Hungary), biggest countries, even last comers 
(Romania). Very small countries (Estonia) have taken advantage of 
powerful neighbourhood (Sweden, Finland) to turn around their 
economies. 
Besides wage costs, high qualification in some manufacturing 
sectors require very qualified workers, technicians and engineers. 
Some member States are attracting investments requiring high tech 
manufacturing (electronics), in high added-value sectors. Big com-
panies relocates some of there research facilities in the region. Nokia 
and Ericsson have R&D facilities in Hungary, Japanese, Korean and 
Indian companies are investing in clusters in the Czech Republic. As a 
result, the content of added-value products in export is increasing. 
In less than 15 years Central and East European Economies 
(CEEE) have deeply changed their economic structure, specialisation 
and have matched the condition to join, for the majority of them, the 
EU. They have become fully fledged market economies, able to 
sustain competition among European economies. Some of them have 
been able to enter the EMU (EU-17) and adopt the euro as their 
national currency.  
In this adjustment process, socially and economically costly, FDI 
has played an import role, as a kind of “uninvited guest”. Some 
Western companies have acted as first mover and made a strategic 
move in future markets with growth potential linked to the former 
specialization. Other has taken advantage of ‘discount prices’ of assets 
in the privatisation. 
Les cahiers du CREAD n°105/106-2013 
 
23 
Table 2: Growth of Inward Stock and Flow of FDI, 2002-2012 
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Source: WIIW Database on 2011 Foreign Direct Investment in Central, East 
and Southeast Europe 
Programmes across the region. Other, finally, waited for a safer 
institutional environment to invest in more secure markets. First 
movers have been able to negotiate good deal, holiday taxes, even 
subsidies to control partially or totally strategic assets. Thus they get a 
strategic advantage, buying market shares, building (temporary) 
barriers to entry against followers.    
Privatization foreign investments have been a hot issue in some 
countries (Hungary). In both cases, as market mechanisms were not 
implemented, foreign companies have generally realized good deals 
fuelling, in some countries, a national resentment against the process 
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Table 3: Investments Entry and Risk Assessment 
Action Strategy Examples 
First Mover Entry before the setting of 
reliable market institutions 
VW in the Czech 
Republic 
Opportunistic Privatisation foreign invested 
firms 
Sanofi, Suez, Hungary 
Secured In the framework of a well 
established institutional market 
environment 
Tesco, Carrefour, all 
countries 
 
Levels of risk have been linked to the progress of the economic 
transformation, to the opening up, to the institutional measures, which 
have been implemented.  
Among the main factors that have accelerated or hampered the 
entry of FDI, the pace of macro-stabilisation and institutional reforms 
has played the major role. Except Hungary, all the other countries, at 
different degrees and for different reasons have hindered policies 
encouraging FDI entry either frightened by the control of the industry 
by foreign companies, or willing to keep direct or indirect control on 
state assets either between the hands of the States, or for possible 
private appropriation. Countries which have postponed FDI entry have 
delayed their adjustment but have not closed the door to entry: 
Bulgaria, Romania, Western Balkan countries are also recipients of 
FDI which contribute to the up-grading of their economies and to their 
integration in the new European industrial network. Countries which 
have the first opened their economies to FDI have beneficiated of a 
rapid adjustment and regional integration.  
Obviously, there is a strong correlation between institutional 
changes and the growth of FDI in the region as shown in Table 2 some 
countries taking the lion’s share as they have advanced in their 
adjustment but also beneficiated of their size (Poland, Romania) of 
their proximity (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia). 
- The sectorial distribution of FDI illustrates both the weakness of 
some industrial sectors under the former socialist system and their 
growth potential in the framework f a market economy. Most of 
sectorial FDI among NMS-10 have been directed towards specific 
sectors: manufacturing (28.8%), trade (13.1%), and financial 
intermediaries (18.8%), real estate, business activities (19.4%) 
followed by electricity, gas, water (5.8%), transport, communication 
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(6.8%). This distribution can be explained both by the ‘competitive 
advantage ‘(cost, work force qualifications) inherited from the former 
socialist system which was an asset for investors and by the weak 
development of other sectors essential for the normal functioning of 
market economy (trade, finance, transport). FDI distribution among 
‘late comers’ confirms the privileged destination of foreign investors. 
Finally, FDI sectoral distribution in the region highlights two 
interesting points:  
- FDI is allocated towards sectors following restructuring or 
Greenfield investments, are supporting adjustment and up-grading to 
Western standards to beneficiary companies in order to allow them to 
integrate industrial networks. 
- FDI brings in the flow of capital necessary to develop under-
developed or non-existent sectors (trade, consumer, finance). 
Proximity is another dimension of the specificity of CEES attar-
ctiveness to FDI. Most FDI in the region originate from EU-15 
countries with three majors countries: Austria, Germany, and 
Netherland1. Some countries (Italy, France) have a strong presence 
thanks to big investment in one sector (car industry) or in the financial 
sector (Austria). Proximity effect can be seen from the case of Austria 
massively present in neighbour courtiers as Sweden, or Germany. 
Major investments in specific industries (car, real estate, trade) result 
in the development of new industrial rings (Western Hungary, 
Bratislava region, Warsaw, Southern Poland) with cluster effects and 
strong spin off. 
 
3. Delocalisation, specialization and control: Central and eastern 
European economies as the backyard of Western economies? 
Up-grading and the role of foreign companies 
Proximity, as it has been under lined has been a factor which has 
accelerated the pace of FDI entry in the region. Once institutional 
barriers have been remove and that transition has neared its 
completion, FDI has spread in different sectors of host economies 
even among late EU comers and even, now, the last applicants to 
become members. Institutional reforms have paved the way and 
                                                        
1 Netherland is a special case: many European headquarters are located in the 
Netherland for taxation purpose 
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broaden attractivity to foreign companies to invest. Investments, as we 
have pointed out, have been directed in two directions: sectors where 
they were an obvious need to fill up the gap with the requirements of a 
standard market economy, particularly to supply new needs 
(consumer, financial services), to up-grade underdeveloped infrast-
ructures (communication, trade).  
Besides, FDI have been directed towards sectors which presented 
potential competitive advantages linked to proximity, to a growing 
domestic demand, to the qualification and the low cost of the domestic 
work force. It has been quiet easy for Western managers, once they 
have taken the control of former socialists companies to turn them 
around and make them work rapidly on the same standards than in the 
West.  
Case studies have shown that adjustment of those companies have 
been realized very quickly, often in less than one year, often at a high 
cost when Western companies have been obliged to post numerous 
managers in the new facilities to build up the management and 
organisational system, both inside and outside de firm (networking 
building). ‘Friendly policies’ towards foreign investors have helped 
(“holiday taxes”, weak protection of labour. Growth potential of 
domestic markets, on the one hand, economic stagnation and high 
wages in Western economies, on the other have contributed to the 
rapid development of FDI and fuelled, in some countries, relocation of 
capital in these economies2.  
Table 5: Largest foreign investors in CE – 2010 
Company Sector Origine 
1- Volkswagen 
2- E.ON  
3 -Metro  
4 -RWE 
5-OMV 
6-Samsung Electronics  
7-Lukoil 
8-Tesco  



















                                                        
2 In the reality, the frontier is not always clear between new investments and 
relocation: in the first  case, there is a net investment when it doesn’t have impact on 
local jobs (country origin). 
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10-Arcelor Mittal  
11- Foxconn  
12-Nokia  
13- France Telecom 
14- Renault  
15- Fiat  
16- REWE  
17- Kaufland  
18- BP  
19 -British American      
Tobacco  
20- Philips  
21- Eni  
22-Shell  
23- U.S. Steel  


































Source: Deloitte, 2011 
Another driver for the development of FDI in the region has been 
opportunity for Western MNC to realise both horizontal and vertical 
investments. Horizontal investments, through investments in new 
facilities to gain market shares (answering local and regional demand), 
vertical (vertically disintegrated) by transferring parts of the value 
chain of the process in different locations in the area. As a 
consequence, the whole productive organization at the European level 
has been deeply modified with some positive impacts (job creation in 
host countries) and negative (job losses in original countries).  
The outcome of these strategies by European MNC has been the 
reshaping of the industrial landscape by realizing huge investments in 
some industries consuming capital and labour (automobile). Table 5 
shows the relocation movement in the region. The bulk of FDI comes 
from Western Europe (81%°, the remaining parts from North America 
and Asia (Japan, South Korea). Three sub areas have come up from 
this movement of relocation: a first one in the Baltic with FDI from 
Nordic States, the biggest one eastward of Germany with Poland, the 
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Figure 5: Stocks of foreign investments in million USD (1990-2007) 
 
 
The reshaping of the Central and East European economies in the 
framework of enlargement policies had three consequences: a linkage 
effect, a hierarchical effect and domination effect. 
 
- A Linkage effect 
The linkage effect is highlighted by the car industry. Almost 
inexistent under the former socialist system (only Czechoslovakia had 
an original and historic car industry; East Germany tried to develop an 
ersatz of the historic VW, the Trabant), other countries (with the 
exception of Bulgaria and Hungary barred from the URSS to develop 
their own industry) mainly Romania and Poland have relied of 
industrial cooperation and FDI (Fiat, Renault) in to develop cars 
which never matched the standards both in production (quality, 
volumes) of Western makers. Hungary was specialized in assembling 
buses; Slovakia has no car industry at all.  
In few years, almost all the biggest European car makers have 
entered the market, either through acquisition, revamping all facilities 
(Skoda) either by Greenfield, often both, with the exceptionally 
growth of the sector (figure..). General Motors came in through its 
German partner Opel; Asian countries (Japan, South Korea) have also 
invested in the framework of a larger strategy encompassing other 
countries (Russia, Central Asia countries).  
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Western producers have linked these new facilities to parent 
companies in different way, by designating specific functions, or 
specializing specifics tasks. For instance, Renault develops its low 
cost car in Romania, where different functions, even R&D have been 
relocated. It’s from the Romanian headquarter that the regional 
strategy is set up, to enter new markets, to monitor new investments. 
The Clio car made in Slovenia by Renault is distributed in Southern 
Europe, Italy, and the South of France. VW has set up a regional 
division of labour with some companies producing and assembling 
whole cars (Skoda), other making motors (Györ, in Hungary), 
gearboxes (Slovakia), develop jointly a new product (PSA and Toyota 
making light trucks in the Czech Republic). Skoda produces 
components for the other group’s facilities, in the same time, the 
company has access to other companies’ products. Thus 
complementarities and economy of scales are two dimensions to the 
integration with the group. In the same time, first and second tier 
component suppliers (almost 15 by car makers have located in the 
area) have set up around the new facilities in order to supply local 
assembly companies by reducing cost. R&D facilities are developing 
locally or regionally. Component makers produce for all assemblers in 
the region. Finally, competition among enlarged car maker group 
leads to develop best practices. As a result, better equipped, better 
managed, many of these companies show a better efficiency and 
competitiveness.  
 
Table 6: Largest Foreign car maker’s investors in CE 
Rank Top 500 
Rank 
Company name Country 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 
  7 
  8 
  9  
10 
  4 






























Source: Deloitte, 2011 
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Today, according to the latest data, the production in the region of 
light vehicle (including Russia, the biggest market) account for 
576352 units, nearly half of Western European (12 179938) itself 
equals to the US  (12280019), but far behind Asia (34210699). Almost 
from scratch, FDI has contributed to the development of the automo-
bile industry in the region. There are fears, of course that the present 
economic crisis will have negative impact on the growth of the sector.  
Competition from Russian (a much bigger market for which Western 
maker show a big appetite) and Asia are real and could lead to a 
durable stagnation even a decline of this sector. 
Hierarchical and Domination Effects 
All governments, international institutions support the role of FDI 
as a tool for modernizing, catching up and linking backward 
economies. Removing barriers, setting up attractivity policies have 
been set up and have contributed to the adjustment of Central and 
Eastern economies. The presence of FDI, with the benefits of 
integration, has contributed to sustain economic growth in the region. 
Even late comers countries (Bulgaria, Romania) have beneficiated 
from entry of FDI, showing that there was still room, and oppor-
tunities in the region to welcome foreign capital. 
Although it is not a frequent question, an issue with the massive 
presence of FDI in the region concerns the hierarchical and domi-
nation effect. In other worlds, CE economies have moved from a 
domestic accumulation of capital strategy (under the socialist system) 
to a model of international control of domestic assets by foreign inves-
tors. Opening up policies and privatizing public assets had to conse-
quence in terms of control of domestic assets. First, big domestic mo-
nopolies (energy production and distribution, telecommunication net-
work, some insurance and banking) have been kept under the hand of 
local governments. In other sectors (car, distribution, telecommuni-
cation, technology), big foreign companies have bild up a dominant 
position (ranking, market shares) with the exception of former 
national monopolies (telecommunication, energy distribution) which 
were not offered for sale during the round of privatization of State 
property. 
Hierarchy control can be considered from two views point. First, 
through the linkage effect which analysed above Western companies 
has both a strategic and organizational advantage (OLI) which is not 
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eroded over the time. Does local companies, either by their initial 
level of technology, by the learning curve, by the relocation of R&D 
facilities, can become equal players with Western MNC and compete 
with them? Secondly, through the control effect (capital control, 
property rights, protection of intellectual property rights) does host 
country companies further autonomy appear difficult to get. Case 
studies in different countries of the region (Stephan, 2012) have 
concluded to interesting conclusions: embedness of technologies in 
acquired companies, the supply of qualified workforce (intermediate 
level, university graduates) in certain sectors are source of local 
technology diffusion and autonomy and constitute a comparative 
advantage...  
 
Table 7:  Foreign companies, by Country among the 500 First 


























































































Source: Deloitte (2011) 
Finally, there is a wide consensus on the positive role of FDI in the 
region both in terms of growth, of catching up, integration. But the 
question which remains is to which extent the positive externalities 
created by the presence of FDI can expend? How local companies, 
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subcontractors, SME can beneficiate of the positive impact of FDI in 
the region?  
Table 8: Sectorial breakdown by ownership 





Consumer Business and 
Transportation 91 46 20 157 
Energy and Resources 63 31 54 149 
Life Sciences and Health 
Care 15 9 - 23 
Manufacturing 79 28 10 116 
Public Sector - - 5 5 
Real Estate 9 2 - 11 
Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications 30 4 5 39 
Total 287 119 97 500 
Source: Deloitte (2011) 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed three important points which make 
CEECs integration and up grading a particular case. 
First, the magnitude of the last rounds of enlargement and 
integration to which the EU has faced and the importance of the 
institutional shocks to which new comers have been confronted. Speed 
(less than 15 years for the most advanced countries) and deepness of 
changes that have occurred (economic adjustment, opening up, 
development of market mechanisms) at a relatively low cost (for the 
EU budget) have been the main characteristics of this round of 
enlargement.  
The process of enlargement and integration has been almost 
continuous with further integration of ‘late comers’ (Bulgaria, 
Romania), and further acceding countries from Western Balkans. 
The role of FDI has played an important role in the region to 
transform, adjust, specialized industries, creating jobs, increase 
exports of higher added value products, and reconstruct an industrial 
network linking industries of the region with Western companies and 
markets.  
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Mostly, the driver to enter these countries has been opportunities 
for market growth, for competitive advantages (getting good and 
cheap domestic assets). It has been also an opportunity to deeply 
reshaping the European industry, introducing a new division of labour 
through specialisation along the regional value chain. 
Entry of Western Balkan still has a positive impact on regional 
growth both in term of economic adjustment of new specialization. 
Although the linkage factor in less evident, FDI is pouring in the 
region, and, at a lesser pace, contribute to the economic 
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